readers' acceptance of the obvious truth that the tripartite soul plays a crucial role in the dialogue's argumentation, and therefore advance the argument that a demonstration of the power of imagery in the presentation of the tripartite soul may serve as a contribution to the study of the power of imagery in the Republic and in Plato's way of composing philosophical dialogues more generally.
The eikôn that concludes Book ix is, as noted, explicitly framed as providing an answer to the challenge first posed in Book ii, concerning the intrinsic superiority of justice over injustice.2 It rehearses, in a nutshell, the representation of the deviant character types-especially that of the tyrant-that occupies Books viii and ix. That account depends closely on the potential for conflict between the various forms of motivation which have their sources in the three elements of the psuchê. Plato thus acknowledges the power in the argument of the dialogue not only of this image of the tripartite psuchê, but also of the tripartite psuchê itself as an image. In the basic sense in which I want to use the term in this chapter, both these images involve metaphor, the figure of thought that consists in thinking about one domain in terms of another.3 At the risk of stating the obvious, what Plato explicitly identifies as an image (eikôn) involves precisely what we in English describe as imagery, and in particular that variety of imagery that we call metaphor. To think and talk about the psuchê as a composite creature consisting of a person, a lion, and a many-headed beast is to transfer to a target domain (that of the psuchê) features that belong to the source domains of human and animal agency (as well as features of other domains too, as we shall see). The construction of the eikôn of Book ix thus involves a mechanism of thought, metaphor, that has been operative in the discussion of the tripartite soul from the outset. We do not know for sure whether Plato would have regarded all the forms of metaphor deployed in that discussion as eikones, but whether he did or not, it remains true (a) that the image of the tripartite soul that he does explicitly label an eikôn is constructed using the mechanism of metaphor, (b) that the same mechanism is used repeatedly in the discussion of the tripartite soul wherever it occurs in the dialogue, and (c) that this mechanism is one that we typically classify in English as a species
